UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

Tehran Fashion:

Key political and social influences 20th century to present day.

How have the youth's of Tehran's reinterpreted western practices of fashion presentation since 1925 to modern day?

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ABSTRACT

> "*Clothing can be used to examine a country, its people and its culture by non-verbal means. It enables the exchange of ideas, whether religious, cultural or political. It can also be used as a form of resistance, which was the case in Iran*." (Asghar, 2015).

The purpose of this dissertation is to identify how Tehran's youths have re-interpreted western practices of fashion presentation since 1925 to modern day. Generation Y in northern Tehran are the main focus of chapter 3, which entails the westernized youth culture, apparel and styles of young Iranians in modern day. Being modern has remained the ultimate objective for upper middle to elite Iranians since the reign of Reza Shah in 1925, however the requirements and pressures of modern living and modern dress have altered throughout time. The veiling, unveiling, and reveiling of women in Iran since 1925 to modern day and the 1979 Islamic Revolution have played leading roles in the changing consumer behaviour, fashions and lifestyles of youths in Tehran.

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MAP OF IRAN & TEHRAN

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Source: Google Maps. 2015. *Tehran*. [Online]. [Accessed 27 October 2015]. Available from: https://www.google.co.uk/maps?q=tehran&es_sm=119&um=1&ie=UTF-8&sa=X&ved=0CAcQ_AUoAWoVChMIotSCypXzyAIVBlsUCh2RYgHe

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation focuses on investigating young Iranians western practices of fashion presentation in Tehran, since the start of the twentieth century to contemporary times. It uses sociocultural and sociopolitical analysis to arrive at a set of discussions that contextualize specific garments and types of fashion changes in specific periods of times. This discussion will be divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 will analyze fashion and dress in pre-revolutionary Iran, which involves political and social influences of fashion from the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties. Chapter 2 will explore what fashion became during the 1979 Islamic revolution, which concluded the Pahlavi dynasty, during which major political, legal, social and economic adjustments were made as Iran transformed into an Islamic Republic. Chapter 3 is concerned with investigating how Generation Y of Tehran practice the compulsory Islamic dress code, parallel to expressing their own fashion styles that demonstrate strong western influences. Tehran's modern fashion scene, youth culture, and consumer behaviour and are also studied.

It is necessary to acknowledge the history of Iranian dress of the twentieth century prior to analyzing what is worn in modern day, to be able to understand and distinguish the significant aesthetic changes in style and clothing reforms that have occurred. There is also a glossary of Iranian terms available in the appendices. An examination must also be made of external factors from the macro environment that influence fashion and dress, which are politics, economy, society, technology and law, in the Iranian context. Dilip Hiro, an author and journalist who received a Master's degree at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, suggests in his 2006 book *Iran Today*, that a cultural divide was initiated between the westernized upper- to new-middle class and the industrial working class that had more Islamic and traditional values. This is when Iran's class structure became more established during the twentieth century with economic expansions when Reza Shah reigned. This class division has gradually become particularly evident in modern day in Northern and Southern Tehran, as one can differentiate those who are from the affluent and more westernized regions of Northern Tehran in contrast to the less-privileged and more religious in Southern Tehran.

Pars Times (2015), which targets its information for researchers and scholars defines Iranian costume by its period in Iranian history, for example from the Sassanian period or Qajar dynasty. It also defines it by various Iranian regions that, in plural, are: Bakhtiari, Balouchi, Qhochani, Gilani, Kashani, Kurdi, Khorasani, Luri, Mazandarani, Qashqai, and Turkaman traditional styles of costume. Ancient Persian art miniatures that illustrate Persian folklore and tales often depict men and women in traditional costumes also. Traditional costumes became extinct by the 1920s by clothing reforms. Dress is the clothing specifically for either men or women in any period of time, which can differ by occasion but since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, dress codes have become quite strict in public and abide by Islamic law. Similarly, Iranian fashion accounts for a popular style or garment that is being worn by the majority. Fashion has gradually progressed in Iran and this can be measured by the success of Tehran Fashion Week since its launch in February 2015.

Panofsky's theory of iconography and iconology (1939) has been used as a framework for visual analysis of the images depicting fashion, in this dissertation. The theory originally applies to 'works of art'; fashion is also considered as a work of art, the work of a designer or creator, hence how the theory is relevant to this dissertation and study of fashion practices in Tehran. Equally, the history of fashion will be used as a visual analysis tool as well. This dissertation also utilizes information given by Encyclopaedia Iranica, which is based in Columbia University, in order to discuss dress in the Qajar dynasty. The introduction of two particular authors of *Culture and Cultural Politics Under Reza Shah* (2014) is of great importance as well, Dr Bianca Devos is an Assistant Professor at the Center for Near and Middle East Studies at the University of Marbug (Germany), and Professor Christoph Werner holds the chair of Iranian Studies also at the Center for Near and Middle East Studies at the University of Marburg. The expertise of these authors will be used specifically when discussed the clothing reforms under the reign of Reza Shah in Chapter One.

1.0 Chapter 1: Fashion & Dress in Pre-Revolutionary Iran

1.1 Reza Shah's Cultural Modernization

This chapter will focus on fashion and dress in pre-revolutionary Iran from 1925 to 1979, specifically the capital, Tehran. It additionally consists of an investigation into the cultural situation in Tehran and how this affected fashion of that era. Fashion drivers, both domestic and foreign, will also be examined in order to gain an understanding of what men and women wore and what they were influenced by. The chapter is broken down into 4 subsections which debate Reza Shah's modernization policy, Queens of fashion, foreign fashion drivers and influences, and men and women's fashion during the Pahlavi dynasty.

The first subsection discusses the modernization of Iran and dress during the Pahlavi dynasty that began in October 1925 and was established by a military officer named Reza Khan, who crowned himself as King of Persia in April 1926. The Queens of fashion subsection studies the dress of the three former Empresses of Iran during the Pahlavi Dynasty, as they were major fashion drivers. It beings by introducing Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the son of Reza Shah, and his launch of the White Revolution that greatly impacted on fashion, a step that he took towards further westernization and to legitimize the Pahlavi dynasty. Foreign fashion drivers and influences is concerned with the main components that drove and influenced Iranian fashion from foreign countries, such as celebrities from Hollywood, western fashion trends like the mini skirt, and so on. The proceeding subsections analyze the key fashions of men and women in Iran, what was trendy and why, also mentioning Tehran youth culture.

Nematollah Fazeli, an Associate Professor of Allameh Tabatab'ai University of Iran who specializes in Social Anthropology and Cultural Studies, expresses in his 2006 book *Politics of Culture in Iran,* that Reza Shah's policies were based on three particular ideologies: nationalism, modernization (Europeanization) and secularism (de-Islamization). He guided Iran away from Shari'a law, as an objective to achieve his policies, into the direction of a European legal system. 'Encouraged by the Persian ambassador in berlin, he changed the name of his

country from Persia to Iran, a variant of the word 'Aryan,' meaning "noble"' (Hiro, 2006, p.93). This demonstrates the countries progression from changing its ancient name to one that is more suitable.

How has dress modernized since before the Pahlavi dynasty? From the Qajar dynasty between 1794-1925 and earlier, traditional dress was utilized by Iranians to distinguish themselves among tribes, villages, religions and social classes, (Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2011) as shown on Figure 1. The Qajar dynasty had started to take direction towards modernization however, considering Iranians' needs to distinguish themselves from one another with traditional dress, the progression was extremely belated. Towards the end of the Qajar dynasty, Reza Shah commenced this progression at a more effective pace into his own dynasty. During a trip to Turkey in 1934, he was greatly inspired by the improved status of women and other social achievements there, which kick-started his cultural modernization policy in Iran and the banning of women's hijab in 1936, (Hiro, 2006, p.93). When the veil and chador were outlawed, it was greatly disapproved by Iranian clerics from the Majlis and other religious individuals but Reza Shah ignored their protests. However, yes it may have been a step towards modernity, but the forced banning of the veil proved to be a paramount obstacle in the lives of many traditional religious women or those that supported the veil due to feeling naked in public without their veils, as they were refused entry into shops, cinemas or even to ride in cars. Therefore, it immobilized many women.

Devos and Werner (2014) debate that Reza Shah passed the Uniformity of Dress Code law in 1929 (later revised in 1939), which banned the men's traditional dress and required all males to wear western-style apparel, such as western coats, jackets, trousers with leather belts and leather shoes, and a round peaked cap (referred to as '*Kolah-e Pahlavi'*). This was so that a national Iranian identity would be created out of many ethnic ones at the popular level. Non-compliance would result to a fine and a jail sentence up to 1 week and also rejection of gaining travel passes. However it is important to note that in Professor Houchang Chehabi's (2006) lecture from School of Global Studies at Boston University, he argues that Reza Shah exemplified 8 groups of people from this dress code, some being the highest levels of the ulema in Iran, other preachers, Sunni clerics, and other religious clergies like

Rabbies and Priests. Subsequently, since there were many different ethnicities in Iran who wore certain colours and styles of apparel to signify their background and to distinguish one tribal family from another, Reza Shah wanted to unify all Iranians with the use of this Pahlavi cap. As Tapper and Ingham (2013, p.162) summarize, 'the message was nevertheless clear: un-western dress was uncivilized dress,' in the context of Reza Shah's enforced modernization of Iran. This was the ideology of many modern Iranians also.

He later replaced the cap (Figure 2) with European-style brimmed hats for all Iranian working men after his trip to Turkey to keep up with western fashion trends, however not everyone in Iran welcomed these clothing reforms, particularly traditionalists and tribesmen, 'Who identified themselves by the styles and colours of their headgear', (Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2011). It can be argued that being western was not a priority to these people; so western dress would have been irrelevant to their values. Yet, shortly before, the same male's headgear reform had occurred in Turkey, with the forced change from the fez in 1925 to the brimmed hats. Religious individuals protested with outrage in Turkey and Iran as they both saw it as an insult to their faith because it disrupted the functionality of praying, as the main religion in both countries was Islam. Thus, they regarded their faith more important than western ideologies of modern dressing. By now, it is clear that not everyone's goals were to reach a heightened level of modernization as a nation through the way they dressed.

Figure 2 depicts a man around the 1930s who is wearing the Pahlavi cap, white-collar shirt and tie. It is also identifiable that he is wearing a double-breasted blazer with the position of the large round buttons, which was fashionable in Britain as afternoon-worn suits. His attire was widely regarded as being westernized and was the standard aesthetic that was expected of men in Iran during Reza Shah's era. It is evident that this man had a clear vision of what western practices of fashion presentation were; also, it is likely that he was from around upper-middle class of society from his interpretations of this western style of attire.

Consequently, there was more stress on males' dress than women's since they had already embraced European-styles of clothing. In contrast, aside

from the efforts of Reza Shah, many upper-middle classes, particularly men, travelled to Europe which also contributed to the increased adoption of European dress with the wearing of suits, neckties and bow ties, (Encyclopaedia Iranica, 2011). This was a clear symbol of modernization and acceptance of western culture and dress. Also, Nancy Tapper and Professor Bruce Ingham who have taught at the School Of Oriental and African Studies in University of London, describe that 'by 1920 Parisian dressmakers were well established in Tehran' in their book Language of Dress in the Middle East, (Tapper and Ingham, 2013, p.180). This indicates that, at the time, there were high interests being shown by Iranian upper class women for European styles and fashions. Refer to Appendix B for more information regarding Reza Shah's cultural modernization.

His reign ended in 1941 with his overthrow by Britain and the Soviet Union, due to his refusal of ending his neutrality in World War II. His son was appointed as his immediate successor until 1979, (Hiro, 2006). Mohammad Reza Pahlavi strived to continue the social achievements his father had made in Iran by implementing westernized ideologies especially regarding fashion and apparel. He was married three times during his reign; all three women became fashion icons of the twentieth century in Iran.

Figure 1: Common 19th Century Persian Costume

Figure 2: Male subject wearing 'Kolah-e Pahlavi' cap 1930



1.2 Queens of Fashion (1941-1979)

BBC's 1996 The Last Shah of Iran documentary reveals how during Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's lifetime, he travelled around Europe many times and had many westernized hobbies and also ideologies of what a modern society should be similar to his father. After being sent to Switzerland by Reza Shah for education, he returned to Iran in 1936 with his first fiancé, Princess Fawzia Fuad of Egypt who he married in 1939, months before the outbreak of WWII, but divorced her in 1948. He was crowned king of Iran in 1941.

Princess Fawzia (Pahlavi) Fuad

Princess Fawzia's marriage with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a political move that united Iran and Egypt. Princess Fawzia, depicted in Figure 3, had also been educated in Switzerland. Her style was greatly influenced by European fashions and was photographed once for the cover of Life magazine's September 1942 issue. She owned many fur garments coats, formal suits, cocktail gowns and evening dresses, many of which she ordered from the Jacques Fath Couture 1951 runway show. Figure 4 displays Princess Fawzia stood on the far left next to her two sisters in London's Royal Opera House in 1939. It portrays her in a European-inspired elegant chevron print dress styled with a fur throw around her shoulders, a tiara and a pair of white elbow-length gloves. One of the key European fashion trends in the 1930's was conservative fashion; this consisted of the lowering of hemlines with skirts reaching the ankles and the rise of waistlines. Emphasizing the shoulders was also a key European fashion trend of the 1930's and she does so with wearing a white fur jacket. As visible, the waistline of Princess Fawzia's floor-length dress is well elevated. From noticing the reflective material of her dress, it seems to be white or cream coloured silk with coloured metallic embroidery or lamé, this was very fashionable among wealthy European women who wore luxurious gowns at night, (Thomas, 2015a). Pauline W. Thomas who has been an honours Dress, Textiles and Design graduate teacher since the 1970s, offering theories regarding fashion costume and fashion history, confirms this.

Princess Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiari

Soraya became Queen of Iran and the Shah's second wife in 1951; she too was educated in Switzerland and London, (Saskatchewan, 1980, p.10). Her style of clothing was also quite European as evident in her wedding photo in Figure 5. Her haute couture wedding gown was a silver lamé gown studded with pearls, 6000 diamond pieces and trimmed with marabou stork feathers, described by Harpers Bazaar - a leading fashion magazine - as one of the 'most iconic royal wedding gowns of all time', which was custom made by Christian Dior, (Harpers Bazaar, 2015). In 1947 Dior created the 'new look', which proved to be a major turning point in fashion after being rationed during the war, (Thomas, 2015b). The prestige of having a top Parisian fashion designer make her dress indicates Soraya's inspiration of European high fashion. This was at a time when Europe was recovering from WWII and fashion was making a come back along with a new consumer youth culture. The Queen was a major fashion icon among Iranian young ladies of the time.

Empress Farah (Diba) Pahlavi

Her Imperial Highness Farah Diba became the Shah's third and final wife, in 1959 and later widow. Her wedding gown on Figure 6 was also created by a designer at the House of Dior, being the famous Yves Saint Laurent. This had set a great example for many Iranian women and made them aware of haute couture fashion. Sedghi (2007, p.167) argues that Farah spent lavishly on clothing: 'Women's Wear Daily reported her purchase of 45 ensembles of Valentino's new couture in 1978, most of its $160,000 sales in Tehran'. Since she had studied Art in France, she took great interest in the world of western fashion. Interview Magazine (2015) discusses that the empress founded the Tehran Museum of Contemporary Art in the early 1970s that opened in 1977. She paid for nearly 150 works of art from artists such as Renoir, Pissarro, Money, Sol LeWitt, Agness Martin and many more. Consequently, young Iranians became more conscious of western art, in modern day, it is regarded as one of the most finest 20th century Western art collections in the world.

Figure 3: Fawzia Fuad: Princess of Egypt and Iran in 1939, jewelry set commissioned by Van Cleef & Arpels.

Figure 4: Princess Fawzia (far left), Queen Farida and Princess Faiza in the Royal Opera House 1939

Figure 5: Queen Soraya (Esfandiary-Bakhtiary) Pahlavi's wedding gown in 1951

Figure 6: Yves Saint Laurent making final finishes on Farah Diba's royal wedding gown in 1959

1.3 Fashion Drivers & Influences (1950-1970)

Western culture evidently existed in Iran, through art and European dress, even more so during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, predominantly driving the fashion styles of urban Iranian youths. In 1967, Queen Farah opened the Shiraz Arts Festival (a large city in Iran), which was sponsored by National Iranian Radio & Television and annually held for 10 years. The focus was traditional Iranian and East Asian music, but the greatest emphasis was on classical western music and the event attracted many national and international artists, (Fouman, 2011a). This is confirmation of Iranians embracing and interpreting music and arts of western cultures, and with many international artists visiting Iran; they were real-life examples of western fashions for the curious Iranians.

The three former Empresses of Iran were style icons and one of many fashion drivers of the twentieth century for modern Iranian women. We can see that the application of western culture by now had become increasingly socially acceptable since the Qajar dynasty through not only dress, but also the arts and that it has made huge progression since the beginning of the Pahlavi dynasty. The clothing styles in the modernized streets of Iran resembled those of Paris or London in the 1970s, although, the more traditional Iranians did not conform to this lifestyle or dress. In Tehreem J. Asghar's 2015 *Good Hijabi, Badi Hijab* journal of Georgetown University-Qatar, he writes that Mohammad Reza Pahlavi acknowledged this and lifted the veil ban, allowing women to publicly wear hijab again. Making it optional helped the traditional and religious women feel less intimidated to go out in public without the fear of their hijab being forcefully removed from them. Consequently, freedom had prevailed.

It can be debated that the improved Iranian economic and state policies of the 1960s and 1970s encouraged consumerism among middle- and upper class women, giving them the feeling of empowerment and some financial independence and security. As a result of this, Professor Hamideh Sedghi, who has taught in various American universities, argues in her 2007 *Women and Politics in Iran* book that more women, unveiled and educated, were becoming increasingly conscious of western fashions and were predominantly influenced by western TV channels, Hollywood films and actresses, and

domestic and international popular singers. A very strong visual link can be made between the dress of the modern Iranian woman and the western woman. During this time, in the up-to-date urban cities like Tehran, middle- and upper class women 'replaced their chadors with hot pants, jeans, mini-skirts, and other kinds of Western clothing' and started to attend universities, (Sedghi, 2007, p.106), this shall be examined more in-depth in the next subsection.

> "*By the mid-1970s, Tehran accounted for 51% of all manufactured goods, for example, shoes, clothes, automobiles, plastics, textiles, rubber, and electronics. Tehran also served as Iran's educational core, with public, private, and Western universities and colleges, technical schools, high schools, (…). Culturally, it offered theaters, a symphony hall, cinemas, museums, discos, parks, sports, and bowling clubs, and restaurants. Americans and Europeans almost outnumbered Iranians in the northern and wealthiest parts of the city, as though these sections represented Western colonies*," (Sedghi, 2007, p.107).

The above quote regards Iran's pre-revolutionary state, and illustrates the extent to which western popular culture was being particularly realized by the mid 1970s. From attending western-style universities and similar educational institutions, more women were becoming literate, helping them secure better-paid jobs and gain respect. Similarly in the West, women had also gained respectable societal roles in the 1970s and 1980s after many protests and movements. A YouTube compilation of old Iranian TV adverts between 1969 to 1978 by 'Farhadjamshidi2000' (2010) show a variety of consumer items, with emphasis on European apparel, being advertised on national Iranian television aimed at the vast majority of Iranians. For a traditional country, Iran had by now truly accepted western culture as a social norm, obvious with the escalation and increased popularity of theaters, cinemas, museums, discos, sports and other cultural offerings among the youth.

Moreover, Iran had become so westernized that Sedghi states in affluent northern parts of Tehran, Americans and Europeans almost outnumbered Iranians. The influx of foreign workers and diplomats, particularly in Tehran

and Abadan, taught more people on how to practice western fashions and culture. To this day, northern Tehran still remains to be the most affluent area in Iran, reinforced by the residency of the majority of the biggest income earners of the country, celebrities and being the core location of all the foreign embassies.

Nonetheless, when the first school of cinema in Tehran opened on 10 May 1930 offering courses on film-making, acting, music, dance, make-up and other related lessons, it sparked the awareness of many Iranians, (Fouman, 2011b). Iran Chamber (1999) states that:

> '*The new cultural, political and economic environment from mid-sixties to late seventies created a unique national cinema that had roots in Iranian perspectives of art, literature and culture'*.

Figure 7 is of the Golden City cinema in 1971, a popular youth hotspot in Tehran. As Iranians were being progressively exposed to Hollywood produced films, they were modifying their fashion presentations to western ones being seen in the films. Sophia Loren and Elizabeth Taylor then were incredible fashion drivers in Iran for modern and stylish upper class women. At the time, movies like *My Fair Lady* (1964) and *Breakfast at Tiffany's* (1961) were setting lifestyle examples for young Iranians who aspired to such means of dress and living. For further information on Figure 7, refer to Appendix C.

Likewise, Iranian celebrities were paramount fashion drivers in the latter half of the 20th century in Iran; they were and still are regarded as key style icons by Iranian baby boomers and Generation X. Googoosh, Figure 8, became a singer and actress from a young age and was well-known for her short haircut and miniskirts that mimicked the fashion trends of 1960s London. She was also a favorite of the Pahlavi royal family. The miniskirt symbolized sex, feminism, and modernity for many western and Iranian women. The fact that she was on the cover of the 'Youths of Today' magazine demonstrates her relevance as an idol for Iranian youth at the time. Googoosh and another Iranian actress Leila Forouhar became the faces of fashion in Tehran, who were sent into exile to America after the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Figure 7: Golden City Cinema in Tehran 1971



Figure 8: Googoosh on the front cover of Javanan e Emrooz (Youth of Today) Magazine 1975

1.4 Men & Women's Fashion

As the history of fashion verifies, the hippie fashion trend was prevalent in the mid 1960s – 1970s particularly in the UK and USA, which many young Iranians had noticed, and wanted to mimic their western counterparts in the context of western practices of fashion presentation. They were quick to adapt their hairstyles, styles of dress, accessories and music that they listened to, so that it would coordinate with the west. Rory Maclean (2007) from The Guardian had written an interesting online article that relates to this and in sum, explains how the young Iranians discovered the hippie attire and music, which was through many western TV channels showing on Iranian TV, music, and magazines, but also through witnessing the hippie trail. "Into the polarised kingdom breezed long-haired Californians and friendly freaks from Bromley. Unabashed and often stoned (…)," (Maclean, 2007). The hippie trail started in the west, consisting of many young adults under the influence of drugs, on a journey passing Asia between 1961 and 1979 towards India. For many Iranians, they were the first westerners they had met on a casual face-to-face level and regarded them as ambassadors of liberal society, when the hippies passed through Iran, (Maclean, 2007). Therefore, it was this way that Iranians were able to clearly see what hippies were, how they dressed and what they represented. Floral patterns were widely available on garments of the 1960s-1970s because of the 'flower power' liberal movement that the hippie counterculture believed in, turning it into a prevailing fashion trend of the '60s.

Figure 9 shows three young Iranian ladies in Zan-e-Rooz magazine with the iconic 60's big hairstyles, thin eyebrows, heavy makeup, wearing bright pop coloured clothing with some floral prints that symbolically made links with the hippie counter culture. Their overall style was inspired by 'Swinging London' in 1960s UK. Popular artists such as Andy Warhol became a major fashion drivers, he used mainly bright colours in his paintings that was then utilized by fashion designers for apparel. The Victoria and Albert museum (2015) suggest that in the 1960s, a link existed between contemporary artists like Andy Warhol and fashion apparel in the sense that young freelance designers took their inspiration from the artists and that psychedelic bright colours utilized by artists were used for both dress and furnishing fabrics, as well as floral patterns that were being seen everywhere. Fashion designers particularly in

London's Carnaby Street also used paisley motifs in their floral patterned garments, which actually are motifs that originate from Ancient Persia, as the Iranian 'botteh-jegheh'. One of the earliest examples were present in Achaemenid art. In Ancient Persia, Zoroastrianism was the countries first religion and one of the world's oldest religions, and the botteh-jegheh was a Zoroastrian symbol for life and eternity. The motif was a major textile pattern during the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties up to the 1970s depicted in Figure 10, which is the work of Master Reza Vafa Kashani, a brocade designer in Iran and Master Abdollah Salami, a brocade weaver in 1939. However, in 1960s UK, the motif did not carry the same meaning as it did in Ancient Persia, because designers used it as an attractive ethnic floral pattern that correlated with psychedelic styles.

Mary Quant, a key fashion designer involved in the 'Swinging London', revolutionized the mini skirt and shift dress during the 1960s and had a boutique on King's Road in 1955 London that became the best place to buy the latest fashions, (Retrowow, 2015). Swinging London, defined by Time magazines April '96 issue, was a reflection of western fashion and youth culture scene that flourished in the 1960s. It was also known as the Swinging Sixties being a major fashion driver in the US and Europe representing the hippie and mod culture. The fashion craze had massive influence on Tehran street style among urban youths, as many Iranians wore the mini skirt and hot pants too, discussed further in Appendix D. Figure 11 portrays a young girl on the 1973 front cover of Sepid-o-Siah' magazine wearing red velvet hot pants, which were very short shorts that became a popular fashion trend in the late 1960s- early 1970s in both the West and Iran. Pauline Thomas (2015c) indicates that it was a liberating garment commonly worn by women mostly in discotheques, a mini skirt alternative.

In February 1963, Iranian women had just gained the right to vote, which empowered them and raised their confidence drastically. Before the revolution, when it was legal and normal in Iranian society, it was part of the urban Iranian's youth culture to attend bars, cabarets, discotheques like Harlem in Mirdamad (Tehran) and Cuccini, and house parties, whilst listening to western music and drinking alcohol. Clearly this mirrors youth culture in the West around the same time period. Thus, Iranians wanted to show they were

keeping up with young adults from the West by mimicking their fashion practices and social activities. Yet, It is vital to be aware that the traditional Muslim Iranians did not follow or approve of Western lifestyles, proving to be a conflict of social and religious morality later addressed during the revolution. Although, towards the revolution in 1979, many women gave up mini-skirts and hotpants for longer and more relaxed fitted garments, this reflected the mood of Iran and the change in people's mindsets.

Two and three piece suits between the 1950s-1970s were regarded as integral apparel by westernized Iranian men, which replicate the 'mod' style in the West. Their aim was to look respectable and smart in a modern way, and to demonstrate their positions in society, as lower class men arguably could not afford such luxurious items of clothing. The men in Figure 12, on the front cover of an unknown Iranian magazine, illustrate how many men replicated this aspirational pristine style. Their straight-combed hairstyles with pressed clean cut suits and large collars represent the 'mods' attire in the UK and US that was supported by the swinging sixties, (Victoria and Albert Museum, 2015). In the early 1960s, bands like the Beatles began their careers dressed in mod outfits, as exhibited in Figure 13. The traditional Muslim men also wore suits but without ties, this has continued into modern-day Iran, as it is believed that ties represent Western cultures. Iranian men of high statuses who have government-linked occupations today do not wear ties in or out of Iran.

In conclusion, from this chapter we learn that the Pahlavi dynasty existed 1925 to 1979 when the Islamic Revolution occurred. The ruler, Reza Shah, based his policies on modernization and secularism, which he used to Europeanize Iran. He set dress reforms so that Iranians would leave traditional dress of the Qajar dynasty for garments that were popularly worn in western civilizations. Forcefully banning the veil, without the support of the clergy, was a part of this dress reform, despite Iran being a chiefly Muslim country with the majority of women who had been brought up wearing the veil to uphold their modesty. In 1941, Mohammad Reza Shah permitted women to wear the veil again based on their own free wills. Western culture was widely accepted and implemented during the Pahlavi dynasty. However, proving less firm than his father during political, social and economic troubles brought him to his downfall by 1979. In Iran, the influencers and drivers of fashion

originated from the West. The three wives of Mohammad Reza Shah were regarded as fashion icons in Iran at the time as they implemented the latest European fashions. Aside from the three former Empresses of Iran, the elements that drove fashion in Iran and educated young Iranians about western lifestyles and practices of fashion presentations were European Art, international and domestic artists and movie stars, western fashion magazines, American-style universities in Iran, western TV channels and Iranian lifestyle magazines. The westernized young Iranians wore hot pants, shift dresses, two or three piece suits, mini skirts and bright colours in social gatherings, discotheques, bars and cabarets to mirror western fashion trends such as hippie and mod styles of the swinging sixties. The religious traditional Iranians resisted western culture and lifestyles, believing that Iran was being poisoned with western imperialism by a leader that was pro-West. Pre-revolutionary fashion and dress in Iran was employed to demonstrate one's modernity and cultural acceptance.

Figure 9: Googoosh – Mahasti - Ramesh on the cover of Zan-e-Rooz magazine around the late 1960s

Figure 10: Persian silk brocade of repeating paisley patterns in 1939



Figure 11: Iranian female in velvet hot pants on front cover of ‘Sepid-o-Siah’ Magazine 1973



Figure 12: (From Left to Right) Hossein Sarshar – Googoosh – Pouran – Vafa, Iranian celebrities depicted in an Iranian [unknown] magazine around 1960-1970

Figure 13: The Beatles Band on the Ed Sullivan Show in February 1964

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2.0 Chapter 2: Fashion During The 1979 Revolution

2.1 The Shah's Exile & Ayatollah Khomeini's Return

The overthrowing of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a gradual yet major build up instigated by many political, economic and social factors. The main contributor to the Shah's exile was the propaganda and upheaval orchestrated by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the monarchy's primary opponent. This chapter addresses what dress was during this hostile period in Iran. It is difficult to contextualize dress during the revolution by summarizing Iran's transition from being ruled by monarchy to becoming an Islamic republic, as countless proceedings happened during a very short time that dramatically transformed Iran forever. Fashion from the late 1960s had become the least of Iranians' troubles and became non-existent; therefore instead of speaking of such a glamorous element, it is more appropriate to refer to the subject as 'dress' and 'apparel'.

This first subsection highlights the key major events and causes from the mid 1950s that escalated leading to the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty and Khomeini transforming Iran into an Islamic Republic. The following subsection focuses on the introduction of the morality police whose duty it was to ensure all women's chastity by mandatory hijab. The proceeding subsection discusses what people were wearing, influenced mainly by the overall mood of Iran. The chapter concludes with how the strictly anti-western Islamic Republic reversed and rid of every aspect and existence of westernization that corrupted Iran, actively referred to by the Iranian government as 'westoxification', a portmanteau of 'west' and 'detoxification'. Thus, this chapter reflects on Iran between the mid 1950s to around 1990. Up to this point, limited academic literature has been available about these matters, however it has extensively increased regarding occurrences and information on Iran since the turn of the century, discussed in Chapter 3.

The Shah's Exile

Shahpour Ghasemi (2015), a writer from a non-profit organization that promotes Iranian culture and history called Iran Chamber, explains that

although Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was king, he competed for full control of the government with Mohammad Mosaddegh, a nationalistic politician. On 19 August 1953, a coup d'état to overthrow prime minister Mohammad Mosaddegh who had caused economic tensions was successfully lead by the Shah, the Iranian military, Britain's MI6 and Kermit Roosevelt of the United States' CIA, (Iran Chamber, 2015). Close Iran-America relations encouraged their participation, and was confirmed through CIA released documents in 2013 that admitted their role with Britain, (Dehghan and Taylor, 2013).

After the Shah appointed Mosaddegh Prime Minister on 28 April 1951, Mosaddegh nationalized Iranian oil, which increased his popularity and majorly boosted Iran's economy, as oil profits began returning back into Iran's national treasury instead of foreign oil companies. Shirin Ebadi, a former Iranian judge, human's right activist and founder of the Defenders of Human Rights Center in Iran, confirms in her *Iran Awakening book* (2007, p.4), that the western oil consortiums had only allowed Iran 'a slim share of the profits'. The nationalization of oil was devastating for western companies who had been heavily relying easy-access cheap oil since 1908 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The National Oil Company suffered from lack of production when Britain retaliated by seizing oil exports, setting a worldwide embargo on the purchase of Iranian oil, hence the economic tensions.

The west's involvement became public knowledge according to Ebadi (2007) when the Shah famously thanked Kermit Roosevelt: "I owe my throne to God, my people, my army, and to you". Roosevelt had bribed newspaper editors to run anti-Mosaddegh headlines and paid crowds in south Tehran to protest among supporters of the Shah. This was a major insult to Iranians as Ebadi claims that Iranians felt resentment and humiliation for the west's interference in their internal affairs whose leader was installed and deposed 'at the whim of an American president and his CIA advisers', (2007, p.5). This was damaging to Iran, as Ebadi continues to argue that 'Mossadegh's overthrow had set a permanent grudge with the West, particularly America, that grew only more rancorous with time', (2007, p.21). Ayatollah Khomeini spotted an opportunity to start using the Shah's close relationship with America to initiate anti-American propaganda and traditional middle to lower class mass anti-Shah demonstrations, contributing to his exile.

Furthermore, BBC News (2016a) verifies that in 1963 the Shah initiated a campaign called the “White Revolution” that was greatly supported, in order to further modernize and westernize Iran, and improve Iran’s economy and society, (Iran Chamber, 2016). This was the next life-changing act that backfired on the Shah, exploited by radical opposition. He aimed to achieve a series of reforms involving the elimination of illiteracy, land reforms and the emancipation of women in society - who gained the right to vote. Also, the Shah granted profit sharing for industrial workers in private sector enterprises and sale of government factories to finance land reform. Iran’s worldwide prestige had elevated and experienced momentary economic stability until 1967, when the Shah crowned himself and Queen Farah as shown in Figures 14 and 15. The Shah and Queen Farah showed pure opulence and prestige with the garments they wore for the coronation and their crown jewels in Golestan Palace. These reforms and the Shah’s intensifying power provoked many religious leaders, as they faced potential loss of their own endowments of land and traditional authority.

As exposed in Figure 16, Khomeini preached in the religious city of Qom in 1963 mostly against women’s emancipation in society for it contradicting Islamic law, reviewed in BBC’s *The Last Shah* documentary (1996), a compilation of family, supporter and enemy interviews. Hiro (2006) adds that during Khomeini’s speech, he addressed the Shah as “you miserable wretch” for his pro-American policies and relations. His arrest two days later and his exile in 1964 caused enormous uproar and riots all across Iran, particularly between university students and clerics. Opposition ideologies were becoming progressively radicalized. The Shah had relied on the SAVAK, Iran’s CIA trained secret police, to silence these riots, the press, and to control opposition movements against the White Revolution, (BBC News, 2016a). The highly intimidating SAVAK tortured everyone that was suspected of anti-royalist activities and posed great threat to the monarchy, (Hiro, 2006).

Despite intending on helping underprivileged classes, the economic reforms benefited the already wealthy landowners at the expense of the poor, intensifying the inequalities between them. Hiro (2006) explains that the growing divide of the upper class and industrial working classes by the late 1970s became a paramount initiator of the rise of a revolutionary movement,

particularly from 1977. Figures 17 and 18 depict the difference between Iran's richest and poorest people at the time, judging by their posture and their attire. Society began to disapprove of the Shah after realizing the great extent to which his leadership was being directed by pro-western influences with much disregard to democracy and Iran's predominant religion. It was publicly broadcasted and disapproved of when President Carter and his wife celebrated New Years Eve 1977 in Iran with the Shah whilst drinking alcohol, a prohibited substance in Islam. Dissatisfaction was reinforced by the highly influential Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shariati and Morteza Motahari who had emerged as the leaders of the Islamic Fundamentalist movement - the monarchy's largest threat and eradicator. Although it had become common in large westernized cities to practice western culture such as drinking alcohol and gambling, it caused outrage among the traditional Iranians and religious leaders since Iran is a mostly Muslim country. The king of Iran appeared to be dominantly applying western culture whilst establishing blatant ignorance of his own culture, values and faith. Soon after, mass urban demonstrations began to occur that triggered social aggravation, highlighted in Appendix E.

Ayatollah Khomeini's Return

It is important to recognize that even though Khomeini had been sent into exile in 1964, his presence and influence was still well existent in Iran and his support was growing continuously as Mohammad Reza Shah fell simultaneously. The Shah constantly exercised his powers in ways that were in not in the favour of the population. The majority of Iranians, mostly university students, sought democracy, which is something that Khomeini was giving much acknowledgment to, in contrast to the Shah. Khomeini further backed demonstrators who were protesting for democracy in exchange for the fall of the monarchy from the early to late 1970's. As Sedghi (2007) notes, Islamic studies in the late 1960s and 1970s were expanding in popularity in Iran, which had become a key driving force among young urban Iranians that Khomeini utilized to his advantage. The rising number of people studying diverse philosophical Shi'i texts was something that Khomeini could relate to and exploit to guide people's perspectives of life, beliefs and energizing them into wanting a government without a Shah, thus an Islamic Republic based on religious laws through Islamic fundamentalism.

Youth culture was starting to change. Many secularized women in large cities such as Isfahan, Shiraz, Mashhad, and Tehran attended gender segregated religious classes to study the Qoran and various interpretations of it. These women started to abandon western attire like tight-fitted pants and miniskirts due to the change in socio-politics. The attendance of religious gatherings in private and public spaces led women to protest on the streets chanting revolutionary slogans. As women were educating themselves more about Islam, it was starting to be inappropriate to expose one's body in the way that it was up to just a few years before. Therefore, it can be argued that women were presenting themselves and their identities in ways to show discontent of the over-westernized Iran. "Covering one's body was now a sign of discontent, even a language of protest, power and politics", (Sedghi, 2007, p.195).

Ebadi (2007) writes that the social mood in Tehran had grown thoroughly vicious by summer in 1978 as protests accelerated. Iranians at the time believed that the Shah was exercising dictatorship on Iran, making them feel less and less in control of their lives and future if he were to continue to stay in power. On 4 October 1978, Khomeini was exiled from Najaf and sought refuge in Paris where he stayed until his return to Iran on 1 February 1979, (Khomeini, 2011). During this time, Iran's socio-political situation had peaked in destruction as protests amplified as shown in Figure 19, taken on 10 December 1978 in Azadi Square, Tehran. Jafar Imami who always had good relations with religious leaders, became Iran's new Prime Minister (1978), he shut down many casinos and discotheques but protests and large street marches continued.

Eventually, the Shah, Farah and their children left Iran with a small box containing Iranian soil on 16 January 1979. The royal reign collapsed, ending 2 millennia of rule by Persian Kings. Nick Bisley, the Executive Director of La Trobe Asia and Professor of International Relations argues in his 2004 *Counter-Revolution* journal article that rapid urbanization chiefly triggered the revolution in Iran. BBC news (2005) reported that 'up to five million people lined the streets' of Tehran to witness Khomeini's arrival on 1 February, this indicates that the vast majority was in favour of his return. Yet, he was not

immediately appointed as the Supreme Leader, this actually occurred in December 1979. Meanwhile, Shahpour Bakhtiar still held his position and power as Iran's Prime Minister since 4 January 1979 until he was replaced by Mehdi Bazargan on 11 February in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 11 February, which is 22 Bahman 1358 in the Iranian calendar, is known as the day that the revolution was victorious and has become an annual national celebration ever since. It is also the day when Khomeini officially declared Iran as an Islamic Republic, as shown on the Ettelaat Daily newspaper clipping on Figure 20. Prior to being deposed, Bakhtiar told Iran that Khomeini 'is free to speak but he is not free to act', (BBC, 2005), clarifying his power and that Khomeini did not simply be immediately permitted to rule, even when Iran voted for an Islamic republic on 1 April 1979. However, when he did become Supreme Leader eleven month after his return, he gradually changed aspects of everyday life, law, and the way people dressed to be in accordance to Sharia Law until his death in 1989. One example is when hijab was only enforced on women at first who had high rank official positions and then eventually down to every other woman in public. Refer to Appendix F for further information on Iran's political situation in 1979-1980.

Figure 14: Life Magazine: The Coronation of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Shah and Queen Farah 1967

Figure 15: Queen Farah walking towards the Shah to be coronated 1967

Figure 16: Imam Khomeini giving a speech in Qom 1963

Figure 17: BBC: Poor women in family house around 1967

Figure 18: Family group photo from a wealthy upper class background 1967

Figure 19: Azadi Square mass demonstration on 10 December 1978 in Tehran

2.2 The Morality Police and Compulsory Hijab

As a young Iranian woman, is modernizing oneself about neglecting hijab and taking up western practices of fashion presentations and lifestyles or is it to be further educated and having active roles in society? Ali Shariati, a French-educated Iranian socialist and revolutionary, believed in the concept of culturally authentic Muslim women. His view, before the revolution, was that traditional middle-class Muslim women had to change their old fashioned views yet break away from Western fashions and lifestyles. He deemed the modernization of these women essential by gaining education and being active members of society working alongside men, whilst wearing loose-fitted clothing and hijab, (Zahedi, 2007). Some who opposed of Shariati's views were generally upper-class supporters of the ideologically pro-west Shah.

Towards the revolution even secular and modern women wore hijab but not all 'believed in the values represented by the chador, but they used it as a political metaphor to register their opposition to the Shah', (Zahedi, 2007, p.87). Hijab did not represent their beliefs and democracy but it allowed them to show their loyalty towards the future Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini. This occurred when the Iran's majority trusted Khomeini's ideology of an Islamic Republic, which was promised to improve the low economic and social state Iran had suffering from at the time. Free electricity was one of many major things that were promised and not followed up by, Iranians started to realize that they had been to naive in believing everything they heard from Khomeini. Issues like this, led to a future counter-revolution, reviewed by Bisley (2004, p.54) as 'a response to the realization that people had been deceived for the better of the new Islamic government securing their power'.

Baqer Moin, an author, BBC journalist, and head of the BBC Persian service, in his 1999 *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah* book notes that one of Khomeini's major social measures was to enforce Islamic dress on women in the early stages of the revolution. It was considered as an abiding symbol of an Islamic society, however in the Shah's regime, hijab was allowed to be worn based on personal and religious choices. It is compulsory for all women to wear the hijab in public as they are in the presence of men. Particularly since the revolution, gender-segregated evening wedding parties have been conducted in order to

avoid being fined or prosecuted by the morality police. Allowing male and un-veiled female guests to dance and celebrate together in one room goes against the religious law in Iran.

Hijab was declared mandatory on 7 March 1979 on state-television that had been taken over by the Islamic fundamentalists. Days after, large numbers of women, veiled and unveiled, started protesting against it as they wished for it to remain optional rather than compulsory as presented in Figure 21. Until this day, women in Iran have been fighting for gender equality and their rights regarding enforced hijab. The government began imposing the Islamic dress code from institution to institution, first on women with governmental jobs, which is what the women in 1980 in Figure 21 are demonstrating against. Soon after governmental jobs came all women who were in the educational sector, teachers, headmasters, lecturers and so on until every woman was required to wear hijab. Figure 22 exhibits a demonstration against the US, led by middle class women in Tehran in November 1979. They are wearing long black chadors over their headscarves for total coverage of their hair; this type of hijab is the most conservative and traditional of them all and is considered these days as the least modern and stylish by young generations in Iran. It shows how middle-aged women were choosing to cover themselves in respect of the Islamic revolution and to avoid getting into any trouble with the newly assigned morality police. Even young girls from pre-school are required to wear hijab with loose clothing as presented in Figure 23 taken in recent years.

Morality police such as the Basij, Commiteh and Gasht-e Ershad are part of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is a military and paramilitary organization that is meant to defend the ideals of the Iranian Islamic Revolution since 1980. The SAVAK had a similar position to this prior the revolution, as described by Udit Banerjea's 2015 '*Revolutionary Intelligence'* journal article from Johns Hopkins University. The Basij are the largest security organization in Iran by manpower, their main aim is to control riots and internal security but also to act as morality police. Since hijab is part of the ideals and virtues of the revolution, it is mainly the responsibility of Gasht-e Ershad to patrol the streets across Iran to ensure all women are wearing their hijab appropriately. This is still being exercised in order to upkeep the morality of the people in Iran, hence why such organizations are regarded as 'morality police'.

Figure 20: Khomeini: “I formally declare Iran as an Islamic Republic” – Ettelaat Daily Paper 1979

Figure 21: Iranian females demonstrating in front of the presidential office against for all Iranian female employees of government offices to put on veils at work in June 1980

Figure 22: Female subjects demonstrating against the US in Tehran 21 November 1979

Figure 23: Group of young schoolgirls in Iran c.2014

2.3 Dress in the Khomeini period (1979-1989)

Ayatollah Khomeini died in June 1989, hence the name of this subsection. Visibility of western practices of fashion presentation had decreased intensely after Iran's transformation into an Islamic Republic during this particular decade. The morality police had to moderate female mannequins in fashion boutiques as well as living humans. Nafiseh Parastesh, a writer for an online journalist forum called Iran Wire discusses how just like women, female mannequins displayed in shop windows have been required to wear hijab, particularly after Iran's first mannequin factory called Mannequin Yaran was established in 1990, (Iran Wire, 2014). Previously, mannequins were imported from Europe to mimic western fashion boutiques, as discussed in an informal conversation in Iran in summer 2015. Since the revolution, it has primarily been the shop owner's duty to make sure no religious law is being disregarded. If standards are not met according to morality police, then the shop owner can be fined or face closure due to violation of hijab on mannequins. Figure 24 is of several mannequins placed outside a shop in Tehran in 2014 and reflects the post-revolution hijab expectations of mannequins that would be moderated by morality police.

Arguably, If a boutique sells westernized womens-wear, then the shop owner's freedom in visual merchandising is limited, which is the advertisement of merchandise on their window display and in store. This is because adding hijab would cover the latest styles, cuts and colours exhibited on mannequin. However, this would not have been an issue is the 1980s and 1990s as the overall mood and socio-political atmosphere in Iran caused men and women to dress a lot more conservatively and become less interested in what western fashions and attire were at the time. We previously observed that men and women embraced western practices of fashion presentation particularly more commonly in the 1950s to 1970s. Conversely, it can be seen that in Figure 25 these women are wearing long, loose and covered garments in December 1978. The change in their styles of clothing suggested a change in their principles and interests, and thus, 'French and Italian fashions almost disappeared from the streets', (Sedghi, 2007, p.203). Women during this decade commonly wore colours like navy, grey, brown and black; this was the

colour scheme of Iran's compulsory hijab too until the turn of the century when hijab rules became more lenient.

We can see in Figure 26 that the male subjects are burning pictures of the royal family and a portrait of the Shah in December 1978; this was an act many people did in Iran to show their opposition to the Shah's regime. It is also noticeable that they are wearing western clothing such as jeans, large collars, leather jackets, and one male is wearing an Adidas jacket and another is wearing Adidas shoes. This is a major contradiction on their behalf because the main reason why people disapproved of the Shah was because of his ties with the West and how he was practically forcing western lifestyles and ideologies onto Iranians, however they are wearing western style and branded clothing. Short hair and full beards are articles of the Muslim faith; it is also the revolutionary guards' and morality police's aesthetic.

It is possible that these male subjects are from secular middle to upper classes, judging by the fact that if they were religious then they would have shorter hair and full beards, and would not be able to afford such expensive attire if they were lower class. Religious individuals of the Muslim faith do not share the same social values as the more secular minded, in the sense that wearing garments to show off their opulence and wealth is irrelevant to them. Western music bands like the Bee Gees and Beatles had long hair, which was imitated by westernized Iranian males in the 1960s and 1970s. It is debatable whether a contradiction exists or whether the subjects in the image wore this attire subconsciously. Nonetheless, this style of dress disappeared after the revolution when the Iranian government directed westoxification, which aimed to cleanse Iran of any type of western influences within lifestyles, political ideologies, dress and attire, and society.

Figure 24: Female mannequins on a store display in Tehran 2014

Figure 25: Anti-Shah demonstrators marching near a shopping street in Tehran in December 1978

Figure 26: Male subjects burning a portrait of the Shah during the revolution in December 1978

2.4 Cleansing of Iran by 'Westoxification'

Westoxification began in the early months after the revolution and still continues to this day. In Ayatollah Khomeini's 1970 book *Governance Of The Jurist*, he spoke of the existing western influence in Iran as corruption and encouraged readers to 'strive to reform' in order to rid Iran of westernization. He wrote:

> *'The agents of imperialism, together with the educational and political apparatuses of the anti-national puppet governments they have installed, have been spreading poison for centuries and corrupting the minds and morals of the people (…) We must therefore strive to reform, intellectually and morally, the members of the religious institution and to remove the traces left on their minds and spirits by the insinuating propaganda of the foreigners and the policies of corrupt and treacherous governments'*, (Khomeini, 1970, p.85).

Khomeini was indirectly insulting the Shah and his regime by referring to the system as 'the policies of corrupt and treacherous governments', meaning that the government was disloyal to the constitution and that it's policies were invalid due to being based on western ideologies. He also writes that the 'agents of imperialism' and 'anti-national puppet governments' have been 'spreading poison for centuries', this is an indirect reference to Reza Shah who initially imposed western ideology on Iran in the twentieth century, (Khomeini, 1970, p.85).

Shortly after 1979, a ban on music, alcohol, western cinema films, women working outside the home and compulsory hijab were many aspects of the Islamic legal and social codes that religious leaders and followers were pressuring Khomeini into implementing on Iran. These were methods of westoxification. As these measures were becoming too overwhelming for some, those western-educated elite members of society fled the country and are now referred to as Iranian diaspora. Moin (1999) explains that Khomeini did enforce hijab on women and banned alcohol, yet he only banned films and music that were considered 'unacceptable' in Islam. The morality police, who

continue to be recruited between 16 and 30 from middle to lower classes, also help to 'westoxify' Iran by ensuring women do not conduct bad hijabi, meaning inappropriately worn hijab. Showing your figure, wearing too much make up and showing your hair in the presence of men is considered un-Islamic and western, which has been deemed unacceptable in Iran since 1980. The morality police 'search for unmarried couples and those women who are improperly veiled or dressed', (Sedghi, 2007, p.216). Western cultural acts like social gatherings with prohibited substances like alcohol and no gender segregation are high offences against post-revolutionary Iran principles, and is often intruded by morality police. They have authority to invade the private spaces of those suspected of improper conduct and arrest everyone in mixed gender company, but it is achievable at times to be pardoned through bribery.

In the Pahlavi regime, the Shah named many of the streets in Tehran after famous individuals from the West, this was then reversed during Iran's westoxification. As Ebadi (2007) notes that,

> *'The streets (…) with names like Eisenhower, Roosevelt, Queen Elizabeth, and Peacock Throne – had been renamed after Shia imams, martyred clerics, and Third World heroes of anti-imperial struggle'*.

Overall, the Islamic Republic of Iran endeavored to reverse the social achievements the Shah had made, as they believed it was corrupt. Another form of westoxification that was carried out was the closing of educational institutions between 1980-1983. This was to get rid of any western influences on various campuses and educational material that promoted westernization. Books of the Shah were also thrown away and any images of him or the royal family were individually ripped out of textbooks. Refer to Appendix G for further information regarding westoxification measures.

To summarize, from this chapter, we discover that the actions of the Shah and the western ideologies that he imposed on Iran became too overwhelming for a majorly Muslim country, whose traditional citizens have always wanted democracy and never quite attained it. The dictatorship that the Shah was leading was the weak point that Khomeini grasped well enough to encourage

and win a revolution in 1979. After the revolution, the government passed several religious laws that included the reveiling of women, westoxification measures and societal gender repositioning. Morality police were installed to ensure appropriate moral conduct in public spaces in Iran and authorized to deal accordingly with all those that showed any negligence to the new rules of the regime like bad hijabi. Women's desires for democracy were not fulfilled after the revolution particularly when they had no options but to abide by reveiling policies. In post-revolution Iran, conservative and dark colours were commonly worn in contrast to years before, which also represented the overall mood of Iran until the turn of the century. Gender issues have been manipulated by both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic of Iran leaders to promote their own political interests. The Shah promoted secularization and westernization through gender policies yet the post-revolutionary leaders used gender policies to promoted anti-westernization and Islam, a major collision of ideologies. As Iran experienced presidential change, and the children of the revolution grew to make up the vast majority of Iran's population today, more liberal policies have been put in place and rules and punishments have become much more lenient particularly since Hassan Rouhani became President of Iran in 2013.

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3.0 Chapter 3: Fashion in Post-Revolution Iran since 2013

3.1 Political Reform: President Hassan Rouhani

Iran experienced major social, political, and economical changes and reform since 1990. Iran's economic state inflamed as President Bill Clinton imposed a trade embargo on Iran in March 1995 that lead to black market activities and as joblessness grew uncontrollably. New subcultures were being established, particularly encouraged through Iranian rap music based in Tehran. It has developed into one of the most powerful and useful ways for Iranian youths to have a voice and to be able to express their opinions and culture. Iranian rappers, mostly underground or based outside of Iran, often communicate the animosity between the government and themselves in this creative way through the lyrics. This is how they articulate Iran's internal occurrences and problems to the rest of the world. Likewise, there is also a Heavy Metal subculture that exists in Iran, both of which are frowned upon by the morality police for them deriving from Western influenced music and culture.

This subsection begins with a brief mentioning of key political changes in Iran up to 2013, as it is vital to acknowledge what has triggered the major counter-revolution that has developed and consequently caused animosity and divide between Iran's Generation Y and the government. It then regards the presidency of Hassan Rouhani who was elected mainly by those from Generation Y in Iran for his liberal policies and improving political relationships with the West. The proceeding subsection discovers contemporary fashion drivers that influence the fashions and dress of Tehran's Generation Y, followed by a subsection referring to Tehran's contemporary fashion scene. The final subsection is concerned with Generation Y's consumer behaviour in Tehran, which is similar to the youth of the 1960s in Iran. The similarity exists with the westernized consumer products that they spend their money on, which stems from their high level of awareness of western youth culture and their fashions. Therefore, this chapter is about Generation Y's culture, fashion, and consumer behaviour in modern day Iran.

With regards to politics, the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988 and Khomeini died of cancer a year after. Ali Khamanei, a political reformer, became the second

Supreme Leader of Iran and Ali Akbar Hashemi was elected as President of Iran in July 1989, who was replaced by Muhammad Khatami in 1997. Iran's most challenging era since the revolution was during the conservative presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from June 2005 to 2013. Religious laws imposed on Iran including hijab became stricter, and political relationships between Iran and the West deteriorated. Negin Nabavi, an Associate Professor of History from Montclair State University, in her 2012 *Iran: from theocracy to the Green Movement* book discusses how a counter-revolution almost occurred during this period. She expresses that uproar and violent protests arose around Iran in 2009 when claims and accusations were being made of the presidential elections being fraudulent and manipulated when results indicated the reelection of Ahmadinejad. Refer to Appendix H for further information regarding the Green Movement.

According to BBC News (2013), it was estimated that 72.2% of the 50 million eligible Iranian voters participated in the 2013 presidential elections and Rouhani won the vote by just over 50%. He was strongly supported by young Iranians, as it was the first time since the revolution when hope for a better life and setting was regained for them. Until now, Iranians had suffered from major tensions between themselves and the morality police, rising unemployment, a devaluated currency and high inflation. Figures 27 and 28 depict how people poured onto the streets to celebrate Rouhani's victory minutes after the announcement. One of the members of the crowds in Tehran told Reuters news agency that 'many people are holding Rouhani posters. Some are hugging and crying. We are all so happy here. We can't believe there is finally a change', (BBC, 2013). This clearly shows how well backed Rouhani is and that trust has been built with Iran's Generation Y.

After dealing with nuclear programme issues and putting much attention onto human rights issues in Iran, Rouhani has gained the trust of Iran's youth who make up 80% of Iran's population today. He has been able to rebuild political bridges between Iran and the US and UK, with the recent reopening of the British Embassy in Tehran in 2016 and since Obama has lifted the majority of trade sanctions imposed on Iran. Iran's political, social and economic issues are improving, which is what Iranian youths are finding greatly promising.

Figure 27: Hassan Rouhani's 2013 presidential election win

Figure 28: Crowds of young Iranians gathering in Tehran to celebrate Rouhani's 2013 win

3.2 Contemporary Fashion Drivers

The successful political reforms that have been accomplished in recent years has given Iran's Generation Y a sense of increased empowerment, particularly since the presidency of Rouhani. Since vast numbers backed Rouhani in the poll that they had initially planned to boycott, they are glad with their decision they made because of Iran's overall improved state. Iran expert Robin Wright, the author of several books on Iran including '*The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and transformation in Iran*', describes Generation Y as the 'politically savvy, socially sassy and media state young of Iran', (Wright, 2013). They are also very technology and Internet savvy, which is the main source of their style inspirations and drivers of fashion.

Many people used their technology and Internet abilities to distribute news and videos of the 2009 protests and on goings on various social media platforms. Consequently, Tehran Bureau Correspondent (2014) from The Guardian notes that the Iranian government have since blocked and filtered many of these websites such as YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber. This has been part of a variety of actions taken to restrict the political and social atmosphere for distributors of information. However, apps have been developed since then to allow Internet users in Iran to bypass the filters, which is how Iranians now access Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and so on. Vincent (2014) from the Independent confirms that 'the country's youth are proficient at using proxies' in an article. Instagram and Pinterest are two social media platforms that are well exploited by Iran's Generation Y that contain countless images of global and western fashions, fashion bloggers, western youth culture and many things alike. Iran's youth also utilize these platforms to show the world what their youth culture is including their interpretations of western practices of fashion presentation.

The Instagram account 'Rich Kids Of Tehran' that shows the lifestyles of Tehran's elite Generation Y on Figures 29 has been well documented in many newspapers and websites like BBC News, The Guardian, The Daily Mail, Huffington Post and The Telegraph. 'IR Street Style' is another Iran-based Instagram account on Figure 30 that offers images of what the latest street style trends are in Tehran, which further shows how westernized Iran's

Generation Y are. Their styles are not so different to what you would see on the streets of London or Paris but the difference is that women must comply with hijab rules at all times in public, but they have made hijab fashionable too. It is evident that their private and social lifestyles and dress truly replicates those of their western counterparts, with Figure 29 showing young mixed gender Iranians scantly clad at a pool party and Figure 30 depicting two young women dressed in what is considered as stylish and modern in bright colours. It is important to acknowledge that the type of behaviour shown in Figure 29 is against religious laws in Iran and the subjects could have been seriously punished if caught at the time by morality police. Yet it has become a common risk that Iran's Generation Y are willing to take in order to have some freedom and fun. Both images suggest that the Iranians are upper middle to high class because this is the typical aesthetic and behavior of people specifically from Northern Tehran whose residents are all from these classes. Therefore, Instagram and Pinterest can be classed as contemporary fashion drivers because of the amount of young Iranians who use them as fashion and style guidance from outside and inside Iran. In Iran they follow one another and check each other's Instagram posts to see what the popular styles, colours and cuts of fashion are with clear western influences because this is what they aspire to look like. It is also extremely common for boutique owners Iran to use Instagram to market and advertise their merchandise.

Due to having such easy and quick access to platforms like Instagram, young Iranians can constantly monitor any style changes and new fashions. Their style inspirations also stem from images of western celebrities that they are exposed to not on the Internet and imported western fashion magazines that are widely available in Tehran's glamorous beauty salons. Currently, young westernized females from Northern Tehran typically follow the fashions and styles of the most talked about and popular celebrities of similar age to them, such as Kendall Jenner, Kim Kardashian, Gigi Hadid, Rihanna and Paris Hilton. The emphasis is on the celebrity's level of popularity and style in the West. Marjane Satrapi, the author of Persepolis that is her graphic memoir of her life in Iran during the Islamic Revolution, was referring to the lack of ambition that today's youth in Iran have in an interview and said 'Their dream is to become Paris Hilton', (Hattenstone, 2008). Here, she was generally speaking about young female Iranians who follow the fashions and luxury

lifestyles of celebrities like Paris Hilton, and even go so far to have plastic surgery to alter their features for the desired European look and dye their naturally dark hair blonde, which is still the desired look of today. A comparison can be made here because as previously mentioned; during the Pahlavi era, Iran's youth also followed the fashions of western celebrities. They did not have Internet then but they did have a lot of access to international fashion magazines and western films to see what their favourite Hollywood singers and film stars were wearing at the time.

Young Iranians are further exposed to western youth culture, western practices of fashion presentation and celebrities on Iranian satellite TV that is widely referred to as 'mahvare'. Mahvare is a major contemporary fashion and lifestyle driver as it shows popular western TV channels like MTV and dozens of channels that show European runway fashion shows. Figure 31 shows a photograph of Fashion TV on Mahvare's list of channels in Iran along with other fashion related channels like Fashion One, World Fashion Channel, and TV Moda. These are the main channels that are watched particularly by young females in Iran in order to discover the world of fashion. These fashion channels are also one of the key sources of information they use to increase their already sound knowledge on various current and new western fashion designers.

There are numerous fashion boutiques particularly in Tehran and other large cities in Iran that sell fake a.k.a. 'high copies' of the latest designer shoes and handbags, so boutique owners and designers watch these channels to be able to sell the newest products. Figure 32 shows the Instagram page of an online Hermes boutique based in Tehran that sells high copies of Hermes and other western luxury designer bags. Customers can order the merchandise through the social media app Telegram that is widely used in Iran for messaging friends and placing online boutique orders. The young Iranian females strive to demonstrate to their social groups how well aware and up to date they are on the latest western fashions and designers, as it is considered a sophisticated and tasteful topic of conversation especially in Northern Tehran. They get a lot of style inspirations from these channels because they aspire to the western aesthetic and practices of fashion presentations, which will be further discussed in the next subsection.

Figure 29: Iran's Generation Y on the Rich Kids of Tehran Instagram account 2015

Figure 30: Two female subjects showing Iranian Street Style in 2015

Figure 31: Fashion TV channel highlighted on Iranian satellite TV 2015



Figure 32: 2016 Instagram page of Hermes Gallery based in Tehran



3.3 Tehran's Fashion Scene

Maryam Ansari (2014) from BBC Persian verifies that 'many young Iranians now have access to the Internet and satellite TV channels', (Ansari, 2014). Due to popular demand of accessibility to western media, satellite TV has expanded in popularity and consumption especially in northern Tehran despite the government's attempts of diverting Iranians' attention from the West. Iran's Generation Y exploit these TV channels to better their knowledge on the latest western fashions so much that it has been a cause for concern for the morality police and conservatives as they deem it 'moral perversion'. However, Rouhani tweeted in July 2013 that 'If some1 doesn't comply with rules for clothing, person's virtue shudn't come under question. Our emphasis shud b on virtue', (Rouhani, 2013). It is significant to recognize that his spelling mistakes have been purposely made due to Twitter's limited letter count for each tweet. Through his tweet, he conveys that one's virtue should not be questioned based on their compliance or noncompliance with the clothing rules in Iran and that the government should be making virtue the central matter instead. This further shows his empathetic concern for Iran's young adults that make up the majority of the population. It is challenging to express one's fashion style as a female in Iran because of the hijab law, which hides what is being worn underneath the manto and headscarf or chador. Although it is less challenging in smaller villages around Iran as it is not as important to show how western or stylish one is because there is less pressure to be modern and westernized compared to large cities and northern Tehran.

This is because they are living the lifestyles that people in Iran aspire to have, and also because they are living among the celebrities that the Generation Y in Iran follow religiously. Shoku Amirani (2012) from BBC Radio 4 reports that an area around Beverly Hills and Los Angeles has been named as 'Tehrangeles', a portmanteau of Tehran and Los Angeles, because of the large influx of Iranians that took residency there around 1979. The 'Shah's of Sunset' on Figure 33 and similar American reality TV shows that show the luxury lifestyles of wealthy Iranians in Tehrangeles act as badges of honour for Iranians because it confirms to worldwide audiences that Iranians are not uncivilized backward people since Iran has received negative media since the revolution. It particularly encourages young Iranians in Tehran to crush any

differences between themselves and those that live in the West to show they are on the same level as them, in terms of luxury lifestyles, cars that they drive, what they wear, and their general styles and aesthetics. With western influences, northern Tehran's Generation Y have created a specific style of attire among themselves that is commonly adopted for four particular occasions such as street style fashion, coffee shops and restaurants, parties and dorehamis, and Shomal attire. Going to private luxury villas in the north (shomal) of Iran by the coast during the holidays is what Generation Y do as part of their youth culture and they have adopted a certain aesthetic when they are there, which is different to how they would dress in Tehran. One can distinguish a Tehrani from a shahrestani (a local from the villages of Shomal) by their apparel, how they look and their villas. Appendix I contains additional information about Shomal.

Figure 34 shows a group of friends typically dressed in what is commonly accepted as Shomal attire. They are wearing bright sport style clothes that are all Nike branded. Shomal attire generally consists of wearing sporty branded clothes of bright colours that are often fluorescent, usually Nike, Adidas or Asics. When in public, boys wear joggers instead of shorts shown in Figure 35 to cover their legs, and girls most often wear sports leggings with colour-coordinated hijab. These Iranians have reinterpreted the recent western sports-style trend that was being incorporated in many designer spring summer collections. They find it crucial to colour coordinate what they wear, girls coordinate the colour of their handbags or headscarves to their shoes, it is socially unacceptable to not do this if one is from northern Tehran. Generation Y have access to Nike, Asics, Adidas and other sportswear western shops in shopping centers like Palladium across Iran, as the shop owners import some real and fake merchandise from outside Iran to provide for this necessity to fit by wearing similar apparel as displayed in Figure 36.

Even though this sports style is predominantly worn in Shomal, it is sometimes incorporated by boys and girls at dorehamis. It has become part of Generation Y's popular youth culture to attend social gatherings widely referred to as dorehamis, plural for dorehami. It derives from the phrase 'dor e ham', meaning gathered together, it is different to a party as it involves a smaller number of people and the standard dress code is more casual than a party, as

some people may wear Nike ensembles with snapback caps. Boys and girls are able to have dorehami's at each other's houses to socialize privately to avoid getting in trouble with morality police, despite the occasional presence of alcohol. Afshin Molavi, a reporter from Washington Post who holds a master's degree in Middle East history from John Hopkins University, notes that many Iranians buy their alcohol from 'Armenian Christians in Tehran', in his 2005 *The Soul of Iran* book, (Molavi, 2005, p.95). This is because Armenians are permitted to have alcohol in their homes.

Girls, portrayed in Figure 37 at a dorehami, regularly wear graphic printed crop tops with denim shorts and colourful Nike running shoes or skinny jeans and shirts, while at parties they wear skirts or dresses with high heels, as observed in Iran in summer 2015. Boys tend to wear suits with fitted shirts at parties but not for dorehamis. It is clear from Figure 38, which is of a group of girls at a party in northern Tehran, that they have elegantly reinterpreted western practices of fashion presentation as their style is regularly seen in the fashion scenes of America, England and Europe. What they are wearing is what females of Generation Y would wear in the west at parties and nightclubs too. We can observe from both figures that they have well reinterpreted western youth culture into their own by gathering together in private environments to socialize, drink alcohol and party.

Likewise, young females from northern Tehran have another distinguished style separate to other occasions for when they go to coffee shops and restaurants with friends in the evening, which is part of their western influenced youth culture. Yeganeh Torbati (2012) from Reuters international news agency clarifies how the 'coffee shop culture has flourished in Iran in recent years' with the increase of young Iranians going to coffee shops to socialize. The coffee shop culture stems from ancient Iran's traditional teahouses. There are many luxurious restaurants and western-style coffee shops around the wealthy areas of Northern Tehran such as Jai Café in Fereshteh and Divan Restaurant in Sam Center, Fereshteh's luxury shopping center. It is vital aspect of Generation Y's social morality to dress accordingly to fit in among the upper middle to elite crowds that are part of Tehran's dining scene and to present oneself very stylishly and elegant to convey high social status. Figure 39 depicts two young females at Divan restaurant whose

apparel and style is a true example of what is usually worn in Tehran's top restaurants and coffee shops. Evidently, their style is very westernized as the subject to the right is holding a popular replica Céline designer bag and both subjects are wearing ripped skinny jeans, which were very on trend in England in the spring summer 2015 seasons. Sometimes, girls wear heels to restaurants but would opt for more casual shoes when going to coffee shops. Their hijab is very bright and considered stylish in contrast to the drab hijab worn in the 1980s. This style of hijab has gradually become acceptable in Northern Tehran however one would appear more conservative in places such as the Grand Bazaar in southern Tehran where the traditional middle to lower classes shop at, one of Iran's oldest markets. Hijab has become a fashion statement for females of Generation Y despite it being enforced on them; they have made it stylish as almost a coping mechanism to tolerate it but to simultaneously express their elegance and modernity. The hijab on Figure 39 would be frowned upon in such areas because society there is not as modern or westernized as northern Tehran or other large metropolitan cities.

Furthermore, the luxury shopping centers like Sam Centre in northern Tehran motivate young females who are from upper middle to elite classes to dress in a very fashionable, colour-coordinated and modern way. Figure 40 shows a young female at a shopping center in northern Tehran, and her apparel and coordination of style and colour is what can be vastly noticed in these retail environments. The style that is often pursued is simplistic yet modern with a classy aesthetic. Women in Iran wear brightly coloured cotton shawls and headscarves during the spring summer months, in contrast to darker colours of thicker materials in winter, because of the hot climate and exposure to sun. The way Generation Y dress and their cultural morals are from the effects of mass media exposure online and from satellite TV. Shopping for fun is also a big part of Generation Y's youth culture in Tehran due to their large disposable incomes and appetite for western luxury brands that they are exposed to in Iran. Their consumer behaviour has been noticed by big named international retail and beauty brands as potential business opportunities in the Middle East.

Figure 33: The 2013 cast photo of ‘Shahs of Sunset’ American reality TV show

Figure 34: Group of Iranian Generation Y from Tehran in Shomal 2015

Figure 35: Male subjects from Tehran at Darya Kenar village in north of Iran 2016

Figure 36: Nike store in Palladium shopping center in Zafaranieh, Tehran 2016

Figure 37: Mixed gender dorehami in Tehran 2016

Figure 38: Females subjects at a party in Niavaran, Tehran 2016

Figure 39: Female subjects at Divan Restaurant, Fereshteh 2015

Figure 40: Female subject retail shopping in northern Tehran 2015

3.4 Generation Y Consumer Behaviour in Tehran

Tehran's Generation Y's lifestyle allows them to have large disposable incomes, which they choose to spend on their appearances, travels, apparel, entertainment and food. Academics Kambiz Heidarzadeh Hanzaee and Sara Aghasibeig in their 2010 *Iranian generation Y female market segmentation* journal article have mentioned that '70 percent of their income is discretionary', (Hanzaee and Aghasibeig, 2010, p.166). Since the 21st century, there has been a high rise in university attendance in Iran, however the labour market has not been able to absorb the high rate of graduates looking for jobs. Bijan Khajehpour (2013) from The Iranian Primer claims that 'Iran's new president (Rouhani) acknowledged in June 2013 that 4 million university graduates were jobless'. The expenses of female university students and unmarried females are most often paid for by their fathers, as this is an old tradition that is still practiced in modern day Iran. The man of the house provides for their family until their children are married. This contrasts with the cultural morals of families in some western societies, since some parents encourage their children to start working from the age of 16 to contribute to the cost of maintenance. The struggle for money varies based on whether an individual is from a wealthy family who have high income jobs like those in northern Tehran, or whether they are from the average middle to lower classes. Therefore, females of Generation Y have less financial responsibilities and have the ability to spend more freely than men.

According to Hanzaee and Aghasibeig (2010), Generation Y's buying power and behaviour demonstrates their materialistic consumer culture. This suggests their attitude towards shopping is positive as they enjoy spending money on products they desire rather than need, especially affluent individuals from Northern Tehran. Despite Generation Y's efforts in reinterpreting western practices of fashion presentation, the modern Iranian woman must first acknowledge her hijab and then the rest of her apparel, in accordance with the hijab law. This is why they feel the need to style and colour-coordinate what they wear, especially in public. Hanzaee and Aghasibeig (2010) discovered that more than '80 percent of Iranian female Generation Y consumers are "fashion conscious'' from a study they conducted at the University of Tehran. This is also obvious from the growing western-branded luxury consumption

they do on a daily basis, whether they have bought the merchandise whilst traveling abroad or from boutiques that predominantly import high copy versions from Dubai and Turkey. International fashion brands such as Mango, Escada, United Colours of Benetton, Zara and Debenhams have noticed Generation Y's buying behaviour despite economic struggle in recent years, which had lead them in recent years to open branches in affluent neighbourhoods like Elahieh and Jordan in northern Tehran to accommodate this necessity. Figure 41 is of a Mango store in northern Tehran and Figure 42 is a screen shot of the Mango's online website with products priced in Iranian currency. Iranians have access to stores like Mango in Tehran and are able to buy online as well.

This consumer group particularly pays attention to labels when purchasing fashion products, and are more attracted to western brands, as they are perceived to have longer life spans compared to local Iranian labeled products. They pay premium prices on consumer items if they believe they have found the best product of the highest quality and if consuming the item elevates their social status among their social groups. Hanzaee and Aghasibeig's (2010) study revealed that 67 percent of this consumer group is prepared to pay a premium price if assured they are getting the best quality and value for money. This goes in line with the study regarding the decision-making styles of young Iranian consumers conducted by Seyyed Kavkani, Seyedreza Seyedjavadain and Faraz Saadeghvaziri who used the 1986 conceptual framework of academic researchers Sproles and Kendall. Kavkani is a student in the Faculty of Management, Seyedjavadain is a professor of Business, and Saadeghvaziri is a PhD student of Marketing at the University of Tehran. They conducted a survey completed by 600 University of Tehran students that suggested that females are influenced by perfectionism consciousness, novelty and fashion consciousness, along with recreational and hedonistic conscious decision-making styles. Find Sproles and Kendall's 1989 characteristics of eight consumer decision-making styles in Appendix J.

In sum, female generation Y decision-making styles reveal that they enjoy shopping as a fun sport, they tend to find newly produced trendy consumer items and that they search extensively for the best quality products. It is a part of Iranian culture for shoppers to haggle with shop owners to get some form of

discount or free item before purchasing consumer products, which most of the time can be negotiated and achieved according to Euromonitor (2013), a private-owned London based market research company. Bargaining peaks around the 20th of March every year when it is Persian New Year when people buy presents for each other. Also, the exposure to western fashions and lifestyles they have, provided by mass media platforms, keeps them up to date with what is and what is not trendy in the west. Iranian culture decision-making style is strongly based on peer influences, meaning that generation Y buy consumer items if approved of or consumed by their social groups, according to Bahar Teimourpour and Kambiz Hanzaee's 2011 *The impact of culture on luxury consumption behaviour among Iranian consumers* journal article. Figure 43 shows a group of friends wearing similar ensembles; they are wearing the same length and style of mantos, similar style shoes, tight fitted trousers and all have similar hair colours. This way of copying each other's style is very typical of females of Generation Y in northern Tehran.

Plastic surgery is also extremely peer influenced, which explains the rise of rhinoplasties and other facial augmentations in recent years like lip fillers, breast augmentations and Botox for the highly desired European look. A Tehran Bureau Correspondent (2013) from The Guardian reports that 'Iran has the highest rate of nose surgery in the World' and Hollywood films and TV programmes are what influence this. This is something that Iran's Generation Y find quite accessible and are willing to spend a lot of money on. Peer to peer word of mouth marketing promotes consumption in Iran and is one of the main methods of marketing that contribute to the success of retail shops. This is mainly the case for the newly established elegant fashion boutiques, referred to as maisons. Maisons exploit Instagram to market their designs and encourage potential clientele to contact the owners on Telegram for price requests. Being a maison owner has become very classy and popular in northern Tehran and large cities in Iran, they mostly offer contemporary stylish mantos with unique intricate designs on them as shown in Figure 44. Refer to Appendix K for further analysis of Generation Y's consumer behaviour.

From this chapter, we have learnt that the political reform in 2013 when Hassan Rouhani became president has benefited Iran's Generation Y in terms of improved states of society and economy in Iran. Political relationships have

recently been revived between Iran and the West, which has already begun to impact on Iran's economy. Rouhani has shown empathy for Iran's youth, which as a result has made religious laws less strict and given a sense of hope to Generation Y for a better life in general. The Internet, social media, western TV channels shown on Mahvare like MTV and Fashion TV expose Tehran youth's to western practices of fashion presentation and youth culture, which they strive to reinterpret through their dress, style, consumer behaviour and lifestyles. Tehran's Generation Y has developed four different modern attires that have almost standardized in recent years. Their have specific attire for when they are at Shomal, parties and dorehamis, coffee shops and restaurants, and street style. Their apparel and style differs drastically depending on which one of these they are accordingly dressing for during the day, inspired by mass media. Luxurious new shopping centres like Palladium and Sam Centre and fashion boutiques in northern Tehran are popular retail environments where Tehran's youths enjoy spending there time at and exercise their consumer behaviour. The status consumption and image driven individuals bargain for the best deals on the highest quality consumer products and garments and practice plastic surgery to keep up with western trends and aesthetics.

Figure 41: Mango Store in Tehran 2009

Figure 42: Mango online store for Iran 2016



Figure 43: Female subjects in northern Tehran 2015

Figure 44: Images of Raazaveh fashion boutique in Gorgan 2015

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CONCLUSION

This study was set out to explore how the youths of Tehran have reinterpreted western practices of fashion presentation from 1925 to modern day by observing key political and social influences on fashion in Iran. It has successfully identified the key fashion drivers, the popular dress of Iranian youth, and has also recognized the changing youth culture and consumer behaviour throughout 1925 to 2016. Additional information to each part of this dissertation has been provided in an extensive Appendix.

The adoption of western dress comes hand-in-hand with the adoption of western values. Tehran's youth from 1925 to modern day have endeavored to reinterpret western practices of fashion presentation, evident through analysis of secondary research that has been gathered, and personal observations made in summer 2015 in Iran. Iranians experienced major socio-political changes in the Pahlavi regime from 1925 to 1979, which altered their culture and social morality. One of the main changes were the forced unveiling during Reza Shah's reign until his son who succeeded him, Mohammad Reza Shah, freely allowed women to wear the veil and other forms of hijab again based on personal choice. Another aspect was when both Kings highly encouraged the population to take up western style lifestyles, aesthetics and fashions in order to be more civilized and modern. However, their interpretation of modernity was far different to that of the religious traditional classes, which caused major cultural divide in Iran in the twentieth century. One could distinguish the secular, wealthy, and extremely westernized upper classes from the traditional middle and working classes from the way they dressed and lived. Western fashion trends were reinterpreted by Tehran's youth during the 1960s to mid 1970s just before the Islamic Revolution after being exposed to them through fashion magazines, TV shows and Hollywood films, and foreigners that travelled to Iran.

The tension caused by the high level of western influence imposed on Iran by Mohammad Reza Shah in various aspects of Iranian life consequently led to mass demonstrations against him and the monarchy. It encouraged religious leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini to take the opportunity to lead an Islamic Revolution in 1979 and to impose religious law including the forced reveiling of

women. This was another major socio-political change that Iranians experienced that affected their way of living, dress, consumption and youth culture. This new morality and set of religious laws brought about the existence of morality police who have been in charge of the westoxification of Iran and making sure the population keep in line with the morals and standards of the Islamic regime. The reinterpretation of western practices of fashion presentation became a lot less important during the years of the revolution and was forced to be kept private under hijab such as chadors and mantos and headscarves until the turn of the century.

From around 2000 to 2013, Iranian youths went through many years of tension between themselves and the highly religious, conservative government, and they witnessed the destroying of political relations between Iran and the West, which had detrimental effects on Iran's image, economy and society. However the political reform that occurred in 2013 with the new presidency of Hassan Rouhani allowed religious laws to become lenient, restored political relations and won the trust of the majority of Iran's population, of which are Generation Y, born after 1980 to 1994. The large increase of mass media exposure of western youth culture, celebrities, fashions and lifestyles have definitely contributed the ways in which Generation Y reinterpret western practices of fashion presentation. Business such as coffee shops, fashion boutiques, retail environments and restaurants have become more westernized in recent years to accommodate this appetite to be more westernized than ever, which exists predominantly in affluent regions of Northern Tehran and other large metropolitan cities in Iran.

The desire to be modern and westernized has motivated females of Generation Y to use the enforced hijab as a fashion statement to express their styles. Tehran's modern day fashion and dining scenes are similar to what it used to be in the years prior to the Islamic Revolution, however the pressures to be modern and westernized have increased. Tehran's fashion-conscious Generation Y has developed a materialistic consumer culture that has derived from the need to mirror their fashion and lifestyles to its western counterparts. The future of Generation Y's youth culture, apparel and fashion styles depends on their online and offline access and exposure to western societies.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Glossary of Terms

- **Ayatollah**: The highest rank of religious leaders in Islam (e.g. a Pope)
- **Botteh Jegheh:** Paisley floral motif
- **Basij:** Member of the morality police, a paramilitary volunteer militia founded by the order of the Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979
- **Chador:** A big piece of fabric that covers the head and falls around the boy all the way to the ankles, held in place around the body with the left hand or underarm
- **Commiteh**: Member of the morality police who replaced institutions of civil society
- **Coup d'état:** A mission to overthrow someone in power by forced seizure of a state
- **Cleric:** Powerful religious men who are members of a Majlis (MP role)
- **Etelaat:** A member of the etelaat is an individual informer of the government and referred to as 'Etelaati' for reporting things they hear or see that acts against the system
- **Fashion Drivers**: External factors that steer the direction of fashion & trends
- **Gasht-e-Ershad**: Member of the morality police who regulate moral conduct and hijab and can arrest men and women in van vehicles
- **Generation Y**: People born between 1980 to 1994
- **Haute Couture:** French fashion term for high fashion, refers to the intricate creation of exclusive custom-fitted clothing 100% hand made
- **Hijab**: The compulsory material that covers a woman's body or hair for chastity as part of religious law
- **Iran**: The name of the country after it changed from Persia
- **Imam**: The title of various Muslim leaders who lead the prayers in mosques, especially succeeding Muhammad as leader of Shia Islam
- **Lamé**: women or knit fabric with thin ribbons of metallic yarns

- **Mahvare:** Satellite TV in Iran

- **Maghnae**: A piece of cloth that is sewn so only a woman's face can be seen, this is the only form of hijab that women in the workplace or educational institute are allowed to wear

- **Majlis:** House of Justice since 5 August 1906, a religious concept in Shia Islam, also known as Iran's parliament

- **Manto**: A coat-like garment that is part of compulsory hijab that covers the body, an alternative to the chador (*French noun: manteau*)

- **Peyk**: A local delivery service that use motorbikes as transport – ideal for traffic

- **Persian/Farsi:** Iranian culture & language

- **Portmanteau**: The grammatical term for overlapping two words e.g. west & detoxification becoming 'westoxification'

- **Psychedelic:** related to the drug LSD that produces hallucinations, also the term for intense vivid colours, swirling abstract pattern, and a type of music.

- Rhinoplasty: The scientific term for a nose job

- **Roosari:** A squared piece of material to cover a woman's hair as part of compulsory hijab, also known as headscarf

- **Shawl**: A long piece of material to cover a woman's hair as part of compulsory hijab

- **Shah:** King

- **Shia:** Noun* a branch of Islam

- **Shiite:** Adj.* a Muslim of Shia Islam

- **Tehran**: The capital city of Iran

- **Toman**: Iranian currency (Today - September 2015 - £1 is 5,000 tomans)

- **Ulema**: Islamic scholars

- **Veil**: Piece of material that covers a woman's face

- **Zan-e-Rooz:** Translates to Women of Today, an Iranian fashion and lifestyle magazine

Appendix B

Furthermore to Reza Shah's cultural modernization, he boosted the expansion of education, new means of transportation, western trends in literature, arts, and the spread of mass consumer goods. Iranian reformer's conception of modernity 'heavily relied on concepts and ideologies that were prevailing at that time in Europe', (Devos and Werner, 2014). In Helen Chaplin Metz's country study of Iran (1987), she discusses that in 1935, Reza Shah endeavored to promote westernization in Iran by establishing Iran's first European-style university in Tehran along with creating a broad system of secular primary and secondary schools. This would later help the literacy skills and general knowledge of newer generations particularly women. Another outcome of the 1940s cultural modernization was a new bourgeoisie middle class, the wealthier ones among them promoted the country's visible progression by commissioning pioneers of 'avant-garde architecture like Gabriel Guevrekian to design and construct their private homes' (Devos and Werner, 2014).

Appendix C

As shown on Figure 7, Gregory Peck and Sophia Loren were being featured in Arabesque; being two western celebrities who were favoured as being influential to Iranians for the way they dressed in and out of films. Iranians were also delighted with the arrival of Elizabeth Taylor when she visited Iran in 1976; both women were incredible fashion drivers in Iran at the time for modern and stylish upper class women.

Additionally, whilst reminiscing the streets of Tehran in the late 1960s, Ebadi (2007, p.17) mentions that “movie billboards showcasing European film stars loomed above busy squares, and kiosks hawked magazine of bikini-clad American starlets.” She refers to two types of advertising that Iranians were being greatly exposed to in urban cities like Tehran. This confirms that this particular aesthetic and lifestyle was being actively promoted in Iran and it was a way that people could learn about what their western counterparts were wearing at the same era but in different countries.

Appendix D

The Swinging Sixties fashion craze in Iran reflected Iranian youths' approval of the West and shows the positive view they had on their lifestyles and fashions by incorporating the garments associated to the trend. The fashion icon of that period was Twiggy, which many young Iranians were inspired by style-wise. Sedghi (2007) writes how during this highly westernized era in Iran, businesses such as beauty salons, seamstresses and shops specializing in European hats in Tehran boomed. Trade was active between Europe, particularly from France and Germany, and Iran for large number of importations of clothes and hats. Many women abandoned traditionally sewing garments at home for ready-made clothes in western boutiques such as Furushgah-e Ferdowsi in Tehran. Consumerism, mainly among young adults, was flourishing in Iran during the 1960s, which is also the period when many newly built supermarkets were appearing across Tehran and other large cities in Iran for the first time.

Appendix E

The SAVAK were being accused of being ordered by the Shah to secretly murder Khomeini's son in Najaf two months prior Carter's visit according to BBC's 1996 *The Last Shah* documentary (2012). Consequently, mass urban demonstrations occurred of which were made up by many university students, showing support for Khomeini and their disapproval of the monarchy. Iran's then Prime Minister, Amir-Abbas Hoveyda (1965-77) had denied the murder claims in a press article, however demonstrations continued to get extremely out of hand especially when many were killed from the army opening fire on them, causing further unrest and aggravation. Ebadi (2007, p.16) then argues that in the late 1960s, during an afternoon when people were protesting that tuition fees were too high that 'basically, the crowd of students gathered at Tehran University shouted anything that would not immediately get them arrested'. This is how desperate people were getting, to the point where they were willing to shout anything so long as they were not arrested immediately because they were evidently frustrated with the current system.

In the build up to the revolution, Khomeini and Dr Ali Shariati gave many lectures about their ideologies of an Iranian revolution that was attended by young women in and outside of Tehran, which had become a very popular activity. Many Muslim students secretly and cautiously distributed tapes of Khomeini and Shariati's intensive discussions of their ideas on Islam and end to monarchy in Iran, (Sedghi, 2007). Despite the SAVAK's efforts, the tapes were endlessly being scattered throughout Iran up until the revolution. This distinctly shows the importance and popularity of the tapes even though Khomeini was in exile. In Khomeini's *Governance of the Jurist* (1970) book he asked the young generation in Iran to 'come to the aid of Islam; save Islam! They are destroying Islam!' on page 79, as he indirectly refers to Imperialists and the Monarchy as 'they'. His book was high on the list of prohibited texts during the Shah's regime, anyone found with possession of it or those who were printing and distributing it would be imprisoned and often tortured.

In an informal conversation that took place summer of 2015 in Iran, it was reviewed that high rank officials in the west initially aided the Shah with the troubles he was dealing with regarding Iran from the mid 1960s. This aid was

given until they realized the shared degree of discontent throughout Iran of the dictatorship that had then intensified, and that a change of control was vital to prevent Iran from socially, politically and economically falling apart. Khomeini was considered as the ideal leader of an Islamic Republic in Iran, which is why foreign powers helped to return him to Iran and position him as the Supreme Leader. Moin (1999) gives clarification to this as he writes how the words of President Carter on 7 December were music to the revolutionaries' ears as it entailed the Shah's fate. Moin suggests that 'Washington continued to work in Khomeini's favour', as he declared that it was 'up to the people of Iran to decide', reflecting on the revolution that was occurring, (Moin, 1999, p.196). As Sedghi (2007) expresses, temporary unity through participations in protests and demonstrations had occurred for the first time in the history of the modern Middle East when women and men, secular and religious, rich and poor, old and young shared the same socio-political goals and overthrew the Shah together.

Furthermore, Moin (1999) argues that a democratic system based on a tolerant Islam is the way in which liberal Muslims wanted to live by. However, when Khomeini was in exile in Paris, he seemed to have advocated a path that turned out to be completely different to what had become reality. He had previously 'painted a picture of a democratic system which would act like the Prophet Mohammad's ten years of government in Medina (…)', (Moin, 1999, p.247). It was questionable whether a dialogue even existed between the people of Iran and the heads of government and rule after the revolution. Mehdi Bazargan believed that 'Khomeini had turned the slogan 'we are all together' on its head and was effectively saying 'you are all with me'', (Moin, 1999, p.247). In order to establish a secure and well-built Islamic system, Khomeini had encouraged mullahs and other clergymen to take over key positions in the government and the civil service.

The clerical monopolization of power that was occurring in the 1980s angered many secular women who were seeking democracy and equal rights. The revolution de-sexualized women and introduced gender segregation measures in public spaces like swimming pools, work places, and educational institutions, yet such things were not apparent during the Pahlavi regime. Numerous women were dismissed of their professional and governmental

positions due to laws that were unequal in gender. Various people supported Khomeini's political leadership however not all accepted his concept of Islamic government, especially when hijab was made mandatory in March 1979. Parliament passed the Islamic Punishment Law in 1983 that allowed all those who violated the hijab to be lashed. This punishment today is not so strict and more leniencies have been given over the years. The issue regarding hijab is still a highly political issue that is influenced by class in society, cultural dictates, state and male-dominated structures.

Appendix F

On 4 November 1979, Iran's political relationship with America perished with the American Hostage Crisis. This is when revolutionary Islamic students in Tehran stormed the Tehran-based United States embassy, taking dozens of US staff hostage. Many others protested outside the compound and often shouted about the fact that the Shah had fled to America for medial attention for his cancer, because they wanted him to return so he could be trialed. As BBC News (2016b) notes, 'In February 1980 Iran issued a new set of demands for the hostages' freedom. It called for the Shah to be handed over to face trial in Tehran, as well as other diplomatic gestures, such as a US apology for its actions". The action that Iran was referring to was allowing the Shah to stay there for the medial attention of which he needed. President Carter rejected these demands despite the fact that 52 people's lives were in danger in a country that was going through socio-political uproar. After several weeks of the event, many were released however 52 hostages were held for 444 days. It took many months of negotiation encouraged by Algerian intermediaries and the death of the Shah to free the remaining hostages on 20 January 1981. The US showed gratitude by agreed to 'unfreeze Iranian assets worth $8b and give hostage takers immunity', (BBC 2016b).

In 1980, war broke out between Iran and Iraq until 1988, which caused detrimental effects on the society, politics and economic of Iran. This added further pressure on society as food rations were being imposed on Iran and thousands of people and soldiers were dying with lack of high western quality weaponries. International media took this opportunity to continue to show Iran in a negative light after the American Hostage Crisis, since the events were almost consecutive. Ebadi (2007, p.60) notes that 'the century had witnessed little battlefield warfare so bloody'. It was an incredibly petrifying eight years for Iranians in Iran who were not permitted to leave the country at the time due to security reasons. Saddam Hussein, unlike the Iranian military, had access to the West's military cache and weaponry from the united States, which put Iranian soldiers in a worse position.

Appendix G

To ensure that everyone complied accordingly with the westoxification procedures in public and workspaces, the government placed security guards to check the appropriateness of clothing and hijab. Sedghi (2007) describes how in 1991 a guard in Bank-e Mellat confiscated a woman's perfume, makeup and hand lotion as they checked her purse in a gender-segregated booth. Such intimidating strict measures were not expected to be put in place in post-revolution Iran, many women were irritated by these rules yet had no choice but to abide by them in fear of getting into trouble. Women have been restricted to draw attention to themselves with the use of tight clothing, perfume and makeup, as the government believed men would find such things seductive and sexually stimulating, and thus immoral in Islam. It can be said that the atmosphere at the workplace in general became quite tense and almost fearful in post-revolution Iran because of the rules that workers and visitors had to follow.

Women's values were brought down significantly after the revolution in comparison to that of men, and as a result have been paid less for their jobs ever since, regardless of experience and qualifications. 'Some women complain about the lack of recognition in a male-dominated world of work', (Sedghi, 2007, p.237). Many secular minded Iranians even nowadays criticize the relation between Islamic precepts and the post-revolution regime practices in Iran, debating whether the regime is practicing Islam in the most natural and appropriate way or just using it for the government's own socio-political interests. Sedghi (2007) further stresses that in the mid 1990s a former Majlis deputy called Maryam Behroozi,

> '*criticized the government for "hypocrisy" because Islam does not prevent women from top jobs; only backward men and an ignorant society discriminate against women*', (Sedghi, 2007, p.240).

The legitimacy of the government and presidential elections has also been seriously questioned particularly during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from 2005 to 2013.

Appendix H

Iranians, particularly of Generation Y were being stimulated to protest against the reelection of Ahmadinejad and his discriminatory polices toward women by the opposition team, the Green Movement and their powerful political campaigns. The young Iranians became the backbone of the movement. The Green Movement publicized issues like sexual harassment of prisoners, gender inequality and compulsory hijab, issues that were once considered as taboo, (Nabavi, 2012). Victor Sundquist in his 2013 '*Iranian Democratization Part I'* journal article expresses that after Ahmadinejad was reelected, many Iranians were chanting "where is my vote" as the official results of the election indicated that their political voice had not been heard. The majority of Iranians seriously questioned the 63.3% of the vote that Ahmadinejad had supposedly got and believed it was a fix since the results showed balloting irregularities too. This caused major friction between the political and religious ruling elite, as well as young Iranians and the police and government. Sundquist (2013) notes that the young Iranians wanted increased political and civil liberties that were within their basic human rights of freedoms within the Iranian context.

The government soon realized that the growing youth-based opposition part of the Green Movement was a true potential threat to the theocracy-based regime. Protests were becoming chaotic and lasted for eight months. The government retaliated by force and authorizing the morality police to use violence to fight against the opposition who were protesting in masses on the streets, which was widely recorded and broadcasted on YouTube, social media and BBC News. The ensuing violence that followed the unleashing of the Basij Militia on the general population introduced the world to the level of political repression that Iran's government would use in order to maintain its power base, (Sundquist, 2013, p.20). Overall, the Green Movement failed to gain further strength because it was not a formal revolution; it was only a social and civil rights movement that the government was able to disperse in the end. Its aims were not to overthrow the current Islamic regime, but to allow the youth to share their voices, and to decrease the power of neoconservative hard-liners. There were many political, economical and religious barriers that stood ahead of the Green Movement's success.

Appendix I

Dokhi Fassihian (2000) from '*The Iranian*' online archives full of articles of peoples' personal stories regarding Iran has stated that according to the local residents, building developers planned these areas with luxury villas separate and away from the locals due to 'the different standards of living and lifestyles between Tehran's rich' can the locals there It is standard for the westernized young Tehranis to drive up and down the main coastal strip referred to as 'jadeh kenar' in the evenings in Shomal to show off their luxury cars as a symbol of their status and to race each other. They tend to show their materialistic characteristics and luxury styles more in Tehran among friends to show each other that they are no different than their western counterparts and that they are well aware of the latest fashions, but in Shomal they do it to show that they are not among the local villagers there. Cultural dualism exists in Iran to due to different lifestyles of the highly westernized upper-middle elite who reside in northern Tehran that dress in a westernized way and have western social values in contrast to the traditional middle class and working class. Iran's suffering economy has caused this but with the recent 2016 lifting of sanctions this economic gap will most likely be filled.

Appendix J

Sproles and Kendall (1986) characteristics of eight consumer decision-making styles theory:

(1) Perfectionism. Measures a high quality conscious consumer characteristic. Items loading on this factor measure a consumer's search for the very best quality in products. Consumers higher in perfectionism could also be expected to shop more carefully, more systematically, or by comparison. They are not satisfied with the "good enough" product.

(2) Brand conscious. Measures consumer's orientation toward buying the more expensive, well-known brands. Brand conscious consumers appear to have positive attitudes toward department and specialty stores, where brand names and higher prices prevail. They also appear to prefer best-selling, advertised brands.

(3) Novelty-fashion conscious consumer. Consumers with high scores on this characteristic are likely to gain excitement and pleasure from seeking out new things. Consumers in this category keep up-to-date with styles. Variety seeking also appears to be an important aspect of this characteristic.

(4) Recreational, hedonistic consumer. Those scoring high on this characteristic find shopping pleasant. They shop just for the fun of it.

(5) Price-value consciousness. Those scoring high on this characteristic look for sale prices and appear conscious about lower prices in general. Importantly, they also are concerned with getting the best value for their money. They are likely to be comparison shoppers.

(6) Impulsive-careless consumer. High scores on this characteristic mean consumers do not plan their shopping. Furthermore, they appear unconcerned about how much they spend or about the "best buys."

(7) Confused by over choice consumer. Consumers who score high on this characteristic perceive many brands and stores from which to choose and have difficulty making choices. Furthermore, they experience information overload.

(8) Habitual, brand-loyal consumer. High scores on this characteristic are likely to have favorite brands and stores, and to have formed habits in choosing these. Habitual behavior is a well-known aspect of consumer decision making, and this factor reinforces its existence as a general characteristic.

Appendix J

Iran's Generation Y is extremely image and fashion conscious. They tend to follow western trends like yoga, Pilates, Zumba and other fitness classes and personal training sessions at state of the art gyms according to Euromonitor (2013), a privately owned London-based marketing research firm. Many of them choose healthy lifestyle choices and those that are from affluent areas in Tehran sometimes have gyms built in their apartment buildings and grand houses. Skiing at popular ski resorts in Tehran like Shemshak, Dizin and Tochal are popular places were Tehran's youth like to go ski and socialize with their mixed gender peer groups. This stimulates them to purchase the latest modern ski gear including snow-pants, ski boards and ski sunglasses, often in fluorescent colours. Tourist attractions like Shemshak, Dizin and Tochal have encouraged foreigners from places such as Sweden to travel to Tehran purely to experience skiing there. The popular sports and fitness lifestyle trend further motivates Generation Y to purchase western-branded sportswear from Nike, Adidas and Asics such as leggings and running shoes.